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Abstract
Over the last several decades, globalisation and a growing
concern over security issues, including transnational crime and
terrorism, has shaped migration policies and the priorities of
states. As migration rose to the top of many government
agendas, a rapid tightening and regularisation of borders ensued
in an attempt to keep undesirable, high-risk migrants out of
potential destination countries. Concomitantly, transnational
crimes, such as trafficking in persons and the smuggling of
migrants, have been increasingly defined as border security
problems. This article examines the extent to which border
control is fundamental to anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling
interventions, situating the debate within the wider nexus of
globalisation and the securitisation of migration. Based upon
their work with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) Regional Centre for Southeast Asia and the Pacific,
the authors take the standpoint that given it is the sovereign
right of each state to control its border and regulate migration,
the human rights of migrants must be considered within this
realpolitik. Clearly, though, this claim is highly political and
contentious. In the article, we explore some of the tensions
and contradictions that have emerged in this debate, and then
develop an argument to suggest that it is possible for states to
combine managed migration and strict border controls with
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the protection of human rights in the current context of
globalisation.
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Introduction
Over the last several decades, two main factors have shaped
migration policies and the priorities of states. The first factor
is the increased flow of goods, capital, ideas, and information
as a result of globalisation. Labour markets subsequently
internationalised, and new opportunities opened up in potential
destination countries for a growing supply of both skilled and
unskilled migrants from less developed source countries. For
labour-sending countries, urbanisation, internal rural to urban
migration, growing working-age populations, rising education
attainment, widening income disparities, and environmental
change have become key aspects influencing a person’s decision
to migrate.1 At the same time, for labour-receiving countries,
demographic changes, specifically population decline and
population aging, coupled with labour and skill shortages, have
created employment incentives for migrant workers.2 Our
future will continue to be characterised by migration, as
transportation and communication technologies continue to
1 I Goldin, G Cameron and M Balarajan, Exceptional People: How migration
shaped our work and will define our future, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2011, p. 153; pp. 214—241.
2 G Hugo, ‘Demographic Change and Labour Mobility in the Asia-Pacific –
Implications for business and regional economic integration: Synthesis’ in G Hugo
and S Young, Labour Mobility in the Asia-Pacific Region: Dynamics, issues, and a
new APEC agenda: A survey and analyses of governance challenges on labour
migration for APEC economies, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
2008, pp. 3—12.
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reduce distances and expand social networks between source
and destination countries. What is more, all this has occurred
against a broader backdrop of tightened immigration policies
and border controls in an attempt to manage migration.
The notion of managed migration brings us to the second factor,
namely the growing concern over security issues, including
transnational crimes and terrorism. Following the September
11, 2001 attacks, policy makers identified migrants as a
potential security risk and concluded that migration needed to
be effectively managed because national security was at stake.3
Migration rose to the top of many government agendas,4 and
a rapid tightening and regularisation of borders ensued in an
attempt to keep undesirable, high-risk migrants out of potential
destination countries.5 New surveillance and biometrics
technologies for border control, including fingerprinting, iris
recognition, and facial scanning burgeoned, making it more
difficult to produce counterfeit travel documents. Borders also
began to shift, and in some cases, have been pushed offshore
as states have introduced preemptive measures, including
systems to enable better information exchange, stricter visa
requirements, and the inclusion of non-state parties (e.g.
airlines) to act as gatekeepers.6 Concomitantly, states argued
that in the era of globalisation, such measures would prove
invaluable to combat transnational crimes, such as trafficking in
persons and the smuggling of migrants.7 As a result, smuggling
3 The securitisation of migration actually began in the 1990s. In 1991, for example,
the European Commission called for the integration of migration issues into its
external policies. The events of September 11 heightened the agenda. See, for
example, C Boswell, ‘The “External Dimension” of EU Immigration and Asylum
Policy’, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, 2003, pp. 619—638.
4 F B Adamson, ‘Crossing Borders: International migration and national
security’, International Security, vol. 31, no. 1, 2006, pp. 165—179.
5 I Goldin, G Cameron, and M Balarajan, op. cit. p. 121.
6 As Bridget Anderson notes, border control is not just about conditions of
entry, but also about conditions of stay. Border enforcement has also shifted
‘inland’ (e.g. through tightened employer regulations and penalties, increased
workplace inspections, removals of overstayers). For a detailed analysis,
see: B Anderson, Us and Them? The dangerous politics of immigration control,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 88 & pp. 115—136.
7 For example, see: A Downer, ‘Australia Leads the Way on Passport Biometrics’, Media
Release, 4 June 2003, retrieved 7 January 2013, http://www.foreignminister.
gov.au/releases/2003/fa060_03.html.
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and trafficking have been increasingly defined as border
security problems.
It is within the wider nexus of globalisation and securitisation
of migration that this debate on border control and trafficking
in persons is situated. Although trafficking falls within the
mandate of various international agencies, the topic of border
control in anti-trafficking interventions from a United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) perspective generates an
interesting debate. On the one hand, UNODC is the only UN
entity focussed on the criminal justice element of trafficking
in persons and the smuggling of migrants. Consequently, border
management is a key programming area. Moreover, as the
guardian of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking Protocol) and the UN Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
(Smuggling Protocol) supplementing the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, UNODC fully supports states
parties in strengthening border controls to prevent and detect
trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling as outlined in
Article 11 of both Protocols.8
On the other hand, UNODC acknowledges that this claim is
highly political and contentious. Critics maintain that arguments
about sovereignty and nationalism are not fundamental reasons
for states to control migration. Rather, they purport, overly
restrictive migration policies and tighter border controls simply
result in serious political, economic, social, and human costs
to states and migrants alike. Another common criticism is that
security-driven agendas are accompanied by the marginalisation
8 Article 11:1 of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air states: ‘Without prejudice to international commitments in relation
to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent
possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect the
smuggling of migrants.’ Similarly Article 11:1 of the UN Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons states: ‘Without prejudice to
international commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States
Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may be
necessary to prevent and detect trafficking in persons.’
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of migrants’ human rights.9 Although largely articulated in
relation to wider migration policies, such debates are beginning
to stimulate broader dialogue about the role of border controls
in anti-trafficking interventions.10
The perspective of this article will be somewhat different from
the mainstream where much of the literature is critical not
just of border controls, but also of a criminal justice response
to trafficking in persons. We suggest that it is possible for states
to combine tightly managed migration systems and strict border
controls with the protection of human rights, first by examining
some of the tensions and contradictions that have emerged in
this debate, and second by defending our argument against
the criticisms made by those who are critical of tighter border
controls and security frameworks. To conclude, we offer
suggestions for consideration and further debate on how states
might reconcile what might be seen as conflicting agendas to
develop more effective anti-trafficking responses.
Controlling Borders: Are sovereign states losing control
in a globalised world?
A large body of literature exists on the changing nature of the
state and the erosion of state sovereignty. For some, the
9 See: J Todres, ‘Widening Our Lens: Incorporating essential perspectives into
the fight against human trafficking’, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol.
33, no. 1, 2011, pp. 53—76; A Mountz, Seeking Asylum: Human smuggling and
bureaucracy at the border, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2010, p.
170; J Lobasz, ‘Beyond Border Security: Feminist approaches to human
trafficking’, Security Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 2009, pp. 319—344; M Lane, ‘Myths
about Migration: Historical and philosophical perspectives’, History & Policy,
2006, retrieved 8 April 2013, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-
paper-39.html#counting; A Gallagher, ‘Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights:
Tricks and treaties’, Forced Migration Review, vol. 12, 2002, pp. 25—28.
10 A Schloenhardt, ‘Prevented, Suppressed, and Punished!? Twelve years of the
Trafficking in Persons Protocol’, The University of Queensland Human Trafficking
Working Group, 23, 2012, p. 25, retrieved 9 April 2013, http://www.law.uq.
edu.au/documents/humantraffic/international-law/UN-TiP-Protocol-2000-
Commentary-Analysis.pdf; B McSherry and S Kneebone, ‘Trafficking in Women
and Forced Migration: Moving victims across the border of crime into the domain
of human rights’, The International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 12, no. 1,
2008, pp. 67—87.
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increasing concern over border control in relation to migration
reflects a decline in state power in the age of globalisation.11
One scholar, Melissa Lane, has posited that states should
acknowledge the limits on their power as well as their abilities
to control migration in general, and irregular migration in
particular. She argues further that notions of sovereignty and
nationalism are not unconditional arguments for greater state
control of migration. Powerful forces drive people to migrate,
and states will therefore never succeed in their attempts to
control migration. Subsequently, there is a continuous tension
between the interests of states and the interests of migrants.12
Others have argued that the decision to migrate is made within
the context of restrictive government migration regimes and
border control policies, which, in turn, have generated a
growing demand for clandestine migration services, including
smuggling across borders, procuring of fraudulent passports and
visas, and arranging of false employment opportunities.
Consequently, journeys are becoming more perilous, and
thousands of migrants die each year while attempting to make
unauthorised border crossings.13 This theory carries weight as
we have seen that the market for clandestine migration services
is linked at least in part to the widening of border surveillance,
largely aimed at stemming the flow of irregular migrants from
entering into, or residing in, destination countries.14 Because
migrants believe their lives can be improved through migration,
people seek out the services of third parties willing to facilitate
both regular and irregular forms of migration, just as critics
suggest. Research carried out by UNODC and others has shown
that much of the migration in Asia, and indeed worldwide, is
facilitated, and even initiated, by third parties.15 Migrants
11 S Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1996. Also see: M Bosworth, ‘Border Control and the
Limits of the Sovereign State’, Social & Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2008, p.
199—215.
12 M Lane, op. cit.
13 J O’Connell Davidson, ‘Absolving the State: The trafficking-slavery metaphor’,
Global Dialogue, vol. 14, no. 1, 2012, p. 32 & p. 39; G Hugo, pp. 22—24.
14 I Goldin, G Cameron, and M Balarajan, p. 121.
15 UNODC, Migrant Smuggling in Asia: A thematic review of literature, UNODC,
Bangkok, 2012; G Hugo, op. cit.
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worldwide often seek out third parties who are directly or
indirectly known to them and who are part of a locally
established network to reach their destination. Often these
individuals are not traffickers, but are small-scale smugglers –
friends, relatives, acquaintances, or migrant workers
themselves – with established links between source and
destination countries. But by turning to third parties, many
migrants jeopardise their savings, health, and security.
Moreover, a large number end up in exploitative situations,
with their welfare, rights, and lives under severe threats.16
One just has to look at the struggles of the Australian
government in its attempts to combat the smuggling of migrants
by sea to know that human, social, and economic costs to both
states and migrants can be exacerbated by the same policies
and measures that are meant to address the problem.
Even ‘legal’ recruitment and migration processes have become
increasingly complex due to the involvement of third parties.17
A trend in official labour programmes causing concern has been
the increased transaction costs being borne by the migrants
themselves, while brokers and private agents enjoy large profits.
For example, although the Government of Thailand established
formal migration schemes from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and
Myanmar, they tend to be slower, less flexible, and more
expensive than informal arrangements, a situation which largely
is due to the excessive fees of intermediaries. Under these
formal schemes, intermediaries (recruitment agencies) in
sending countries and in Thailand are responsible for procuring
and registering migrant workers, organising pre-departure
orientation and training, and acting as mediators in the event
of labour disputes between workers and employers. Gover-
nments, on the whole, are not involved in the processes.
16 K Tamas and J Palme, ‘Transnational Approaches to Reforming Migration Regimes’
in K Tamas and J Palme (eds.), Globalizing Migration Regimes: New challenges
to transnational cooperation, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006, p. 3.
17 G Hugo, p. 23; also see: S Molland, ‘Is ‘Safe Migration’ Along the Thai-Lao Border
Truly ‘Safe’?’, Asia Pacific Memo, 2012, retrieved 10 January 2013, http://
www.asiapacificmemo.ca/is-safe-migration-along-the-thai-lao-border-truly-
safewebhttp://www.asiapacificmemo.ca/is-safe-migration-along-the-thai-lao-
border-truly-safe.
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What is more, the system is neither highly regulated nor
transparent, making it easy for both authorised and
unauthorised recruitment agencies to take advantage of
migrants who, in turn, understand little about the complex
and time-consuming application procedures. Although the
formal migration schemes aim to prevent migrant workers
from paying excessive fees, the actual cost of formal
recruitment is high, much higher than the costs associated
with irregular forms of migration.18 For example, it is
estimated that the brokerage fees for one passport under
Thailand’s national verification plan, which enables irregular
migrant workers in Thailand to acquire legalised status through
the issuance of temporary passports, has reached US$500-
700 per passport, equivalent to several months’ wages.19
Migrants, predominantly from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and
Myanmar, have no choice but to take out large loans to cover
the costs. As Graeme Hugo points out, the migration industry
continues to grow, and a key problem with regular and
irregular systems is the excessive rent-taking involved in both
source and destination countries.20 We do not dispute this
depiction. Migrants are susceptible to abuse, exploitation,
and trafficking, and in part this is due to the costs of migration
and the involvement of third parties, often resulting in
migrants facing situations of leveraged debt. Research carried
out by the United Nations Inter-Agency Project (UNIAP) on
Human Trafficking found that debt bondage and the use of
brokers significantly increased the risk of exploitation and
trafficking. Data involving Cambodian deportees from Thailand
showed that male migrants, in particular, were almost twice
as likely to be cheated or trafficked as female migrants,
primarily because the risk of being exploited or trafficked
increased one and a half times for every broker involved, and
men used brokers more often than women.21
18 S Chantavanich, The Mekong Challenge: An honest broker — Improving cross-
border recruitment practices for the benefit of government, workers and
employers, International Labour Organization, 2008, retrieved 27 May 2013,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/child/trafficking/
downloads/buildingknowledge/anhonestbroker.pdf.
19 Interview, A Hall, IPSR Foreign Expert, Mahidol University, 11 January 2013.
20 G Hugo, p. 42.
21 United Nations Inter-Agency Project (UNIAP) on Human Trafficking, Human
Trafficking Sentinel Surveillance. Poipet 2009-2010, UNIAP, Bangkok, 2010, p. 49.
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But then the question becomes, what should be the role of
border controls in combatting the problem when much of the
problem has to do with the involvement of third parties,
excessive rent taking, corruption, and mismanagement of
migration systems? For many observers, restrictive borders
and migration systems are the problem, not the solution.
Critics maintain that, aside from traffickers, states are the
principal violators of migrants’ human rights. Frontline border
and immigration officials often participate or are complicit
in the aforementioned activities. What is more, thousands of
migrants are held each year in detention for considerable
periods of time while officials attempt to determine if a
person is smuggled, trafficked, or an asylum seeker.22 At the
least, states fail to prevent and protect human rights violations
committed by those who exploit others for economic gains.
In each of these ways, the state has impeded or failed to
uphold human rights, just as critics have noted.
Primary Responsibility for Human Rights Rests with the
State
This line of reasoning is valid as far as it goes, but in our opinion,
it does not go far enough. For it is also true that genuine human
rights protections for migrants, whether trafficked or not, can
only be enforced and upheld by sovereign states or by
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)
working with their assistance. Ultimately, the primary
responsibility rests with the state to address trafficking in
persons and uphold the migrants’ human rights. This is the
reality that a feasible and meaningful discussion on the role of
border controls in anti-trafficking responses must take into
account. To ignore or deny it will only serve to worsen the
present situation. States are not going to open their borders to
the free flow of migrants, no matter how much they are
criticised. Even if one concedes that states are losing control,
having a sense of control over one’s border, as Will Kymlicka
22 J O’Connell Davidson, p. 39.
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argues, is of the utmost importance.23 First, it reduces fear,
makes citizens feel secure, and takes some of the heat out
of political debates on migration. Second, in most countries,
there is little support for large-scale migration as well as a
strong moralistic objection to rewarding irregular migrants
who enter under false pretences. Third, it is easier for
migrants to integrate into countries like Australia and Canada,
where migration is managed and the result of state selection
because large numbers of irregular migrants often result in a
backlash against multiculturalism.24
None of these points makes a case as to why border controls
should have a role to play in anti-trafficking responses per
se; rather, they show that sovereignty and nationalism are
still powerful norms influencing border controls and migration
policies. Yet, however one appraises the overall relationship
between border controls, regulated migration systems,
trafficking in persons, and human rights, the analysis and
suggestions that follow are constructed on a premise that
few critics can dispute. Our premise is that most state border
controls, as they currently stand, are neither preventing
trafficking nor upholding the human rights of victims. For
the most part, border controls worldwide fail to prevent and
detect trafficking in persons. However, this needs to be fixed.
States See Border Control as an Important Element to
Anti-trafficking Interventions
Given that it is the sovereign right of each state to control its
border and regulate migration, it is also imperative that we
see how the human rights of migrants can fit within the
realpolitik of migration control. Again, one might ask why? To
this question, our response is straightforward. States, for the
most part, have adopted a criminal justice approach to address
23 W Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, failure, and the future, Migration Policy
Institute, Washington, DC, 2012, pp. 22—23.
24 Ibid.
DOI: 10.14197/atr.20121321
25
R Miller and S Baumeister
trafficking in persons. The main principles that form the
basis of this approach are captured in the Trafficking and
Smuggling Protocols as well as other international agreements,
such as the Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings. As of September 2013, 117
countries have ratified the Trafficking Protocol, requiring
states to criminalise all forms of trafficking, prosecute and
punish traffickers, strengthen national borders to combat
the problem, promote cooperation among states, and protect
and assist victims. As Chantal Thomas argues, ‘These
international instruments suggest that states have not
relinquished sovereign territorial prerogative – they have
employed international law to enhance rather than to impede
it.’25 Because both Protocols acknowledge the sovereign right
of states to control their borders and regulate migration,
UNODC fully supports this position and works with states, as
part of its mandate, to promote adherence to the two
Protocols and assist states in their implementation.
Admittedly, the anti-trafficking frameworks developed by a
number of states have more to do with political prerogatives
than the legal obligations of the Trafficking Protocol.
Nonetheless, as Gallagher and Holmes note, ‘The securing of
general agreement on the nature of the problem [trafficking
in persons] and the direction and scope of required solutions
is widely lauded as evidence of real and tangible progress.’26
Regardless of arguments against it, the instrument is a clear
signal that trafficking in persons, at least in the eyes of the
states, is a criminal justice issue of which border controls are
an important part. Does it suggest the reluctance of states
to respect the rights of migrants? Perhaps to some, but as
Susan Kneebone points out, the weak support for the UN
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers intimates that the ‘security-criminal justice dialogue
25 C Thomas, ‘What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean for
Sovereignty?’ Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no. 13—72, p. 43.
26 A Gallagher and Holmes, ‘Developing an Effective Criminal Justice Response to
Trafficking in Persons: Lessons from the Front Line’, International Criminal
Justice Review, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2008, p.320.
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succeeded when a rights dialogue failed’.27 Notwithstanding
the support states give to the Trafficking Protocol and its
Article 11, which mandates the strengthening of border
controls to prevent and detect trafficking in persons, significant
practical challenges remain in doing this effectively and with
a human rights approach.
Possible Ways Forward for Consideration and Debate
What then is to be done? First and foremost, we need to address
the practical obstacles faced by states in terms of translating
Protocol obligations into effective actions, especially in relation
to border controls and managed migration systems. Identified
below are a few fundamental constraints states are facing,
coupled with some suggestions for consideration and further
debate on how states might reconcile tightly managed migration
systems and strict border controls with the protection of human
rights in the current context of globalisation. It is worth noting
that we do not present anything new. Change, however, does
not occur in the short run; thus, the suggestions below are some
actions that should be prioritised.
Strengthen Capacities to Identify, Protect, and Assist Trafficking
Victims
A constraint in border control provisions is the prompt and
accurate identification of victims.28 In this regard, we agree
with critics that victims of trafficking are more likely to be
identified as persons in breach of migration laws and deported
or incarcerated, often without question. One of the main reasons
for this stems from the definition of trafficking provided by
the Trafficking  Protocol. The definition does not offer a
27 S Kneebone, ‘The Refugee-Trafficking Nexus: Making good (the) connections’,
Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, 2010, pp. 137—160.
28 Victim identification is a complex issue. For a good overview, see A Brunovskis
and R Surtees, Out of Sight? Approaches and challenges in the identification
of victims, Fafo, 2012, p. 8, retrieved 11 April 2013,http://www.fafo.no/
pub/rapp/20255/20255.pdf.
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clear distinction between the experiences of trafficked victims
and that of other groups of migrants. Rather, trafficking is
seen as a subset of irregular migration, and also as a
phenomenon distinct from smuggling. The linkages and
overlaps are overlooked largely because the two Protocols
make a clear distinction between the two phenomena.
However, since practices of trafficking are intertwined with
smuggling, especially manifest in the Southeast Asian region,
it is often difficult for border officials to distinguish a
trafficked migrant from a smuggled one. Subsequently, there
is a predisposition to label and treat them all as irregular or
smuggled migrants, which typically results in deportation even
if the migrant has been trafficked.
Based on the realities described above, one possible solution,
which is being lobbied for in the United Kingdom (UK), is the
appointment of a non-partisan Anti-Trafficking Commissioner
to bring consistency and accountability to government
interventions. The Commissioner would be authorised to
conduct unannounced visits, launch independent investigations,
and promote the interests of victims. The recommendation
stems from a report by the Centre for Social Justice, a UK
based think tank, which examined the national response to
trafficking in persons.29 Released in March 2013, the report
also suggests the establishment of a single competent authority
to oversee victim identification to ensure the UK response is
victim-centred and that human rights are protected.30 Both
of these recommendations offer potential solutions to
structural problems.
In addition to increased calls for oversight, the report also found
evidence that victims can be properly identified at border controls
as long as staff members understand that a trafficked person is
first and foremost a victim, not an illegal migrant.31 In this
29 Centre for Social Justice, It Happens Here: Equipping the United Kingdom to
fight modern slavery, Centre for Social Justice, 2013, p.19, retrieved 19
June 2013, http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/
Pdf%20reports/CSJ_Slavery_Full_Report_WEB(5).pdf.
30 Ibid., p. 20.
31 Ibid., pp. 90—91.
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regard, the need for well-trained, experienced frontline border
and immigration officials cannot be underestimated. Yet,
training as an effective anti-trafficking intervention is highly
contested. The system is one in which frontline officials (i.e.
the state) determine the status of the migrant, specifically
whether she or he qualifies as a trafficking victim. From the
perspective of critics, the system suffers from serious flaws.
Because each state judges for itself whether a particular
migrant will receive assistance or be deported, critics argue
the system itself contributes to their vulnerability. Migrants,
whether trafficked or not, will continuously fear frontline
officials given their socio-legal status.32 Training will never
resolve this structural issue. Once more, we do not dispute
this and acknowledge that victim identification can be a
double-edged sword. But because it is the state that decides
who counts as a victim of trafficking, it is critical that frontline
officials have the proper knowledge and skills; otherwise, all
victims of trafficking will be identified as irregular migrants.
In our experience, frontline officials are often ill equipped to
identify and assist victims. This situation is tied in part to the
linkages and overlaps of trafficking and smuggling. But it also
reflects the lack of a general understanding that trafficking in
persons and the smuggling of migrants are part of a continuum
in the migration process, and that a smuggled person one day
may be a trafficked person the next. Border and immigration
officials need continuous support, resources, training, and
mentoring to effectively fulfil their duties, not just in identifying
and assisting victims, but also in managing initial aspects of an
investigation in suspected cases of trafficking, including the
preservation of evidence and detention of suspects. Gallagher
and Holmes note that the Council of Europe Convention on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings explicitly states
that the accurate identification of victims is critical to the
provisions of protection and assistance, and failure in this regard
will likely result in a denial of their human rights.33 Identification
32 B Anderson, ‘Where’s the Harm in That? Immigration enforcement, trafficking,
and the protection of migrants’ rights’, American Behavioral Scientist, vol.
56, no. 9, 2012, pp. 1241—1257.
33 A Gallagher and Holmes, p. 326 & p. 329.
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and protection procedures of frontline border and immigration
officials should be independently assessed on a regular basis (e.g.
by a non-partisan Anti-Trafficking Commissioner) to ensure they
are responsive, consistent, and transparent.
Greater engagement with frontline border and immigration officials
(for example, through training and capacity building activities) in
the Southeast Asian region has also opened up opportunities for
agencies like UNODC as well as NGOs to influence and promote
human rights. State officials have more contact with organisations
that advocate for the rights of trafficked and smuggled migrants.
Whether this has improved the rights of migrants is open for debate,
but at least the potential exists for human rights concerns to be
integrated into frontline border control and immigration work.
 
Maximise the Resources for Border Control and Immigration
as Part of a Multi-faceted Approach to Combat Trafficking
Another fundamental constraint is the lack of appropriate
resources to effectively manage migration. Not all states have
the resources of the United States government, for example,
which spent close to US$18 billion on federal immigration
enforcement during the 2012 fiscal year. This amount was 24%
higher than the total combined budgets for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Secret Service, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, a 2013 study by the
Migration Policy Institute (MPI) found.34 Border control at entry
points has become effective,35 but MPI also acknowledged that
enforcement alone is not sufficient to effectively deal with the
broader challenges that both regular and irregular migration
pose to the state.36 Herein lies an important point. Border
34 D Meissner, D Kerwin, M Chishti and C Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the
United States: The rise of a formidable machinery, Migration Policy Institute, 2013, p.
9, retrieved 14 January 2013, www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf.
35 For example, levels of apprehension fell to historic lows along the U.S.-Mexico border
in 2011 if this is taken as a measure of effectiveness (Ibid., p. 26).
36 Ibid., p. 13.
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controls and managed migration systems do have a role in
anti-trafficking responses, but should be seen as just one
part of a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach to
trafficking in persons. Other elements are also critical,
although the details are beyond the scope of this discussion.37
That said, we do suggest that states maximise the resources
provided to border and immigration enforcement, specifically
for the protection of trafficking victims in particular, as well as
the human rights of migrants in general. This objective is
paramount to an effective anti-trafficking response that involves
tightened borders and regulated migration systems. Protection
resources can be maximised by adding new resources into the
system and better utilising the resources that exist. All states
under both Protocols have a legal obligation to protect the
rights of trafficked and smuggled migrants. Increased resources
as well as proper training on how to uphold the human rights of
all migrants, not just trafficking victims, are positive starting
points.
Following on from this recommendation is the need to improve
the governance of migration systems in both source and
destination countries. Institutional mechanisms can be
developed to protect migrant workers, including frameworks
to ensure the protection of migrant workers’ rights, the licensing
and regulation of recruitment agencies, the negotiation of
bilateral agreements, and the training of migrant workers prior
to departure, as well as the provision of protection and
repatriation programmes that take the principle of non-
refoulement into account. Some states have enacted such
measures; yet, they still fail to protect migrants from abuse
and exploitation. A key reason for this is corruption and vested
interests in maintaining existing exploitative systems for
financial gains.38 Tackling these systemic problems of
corruption, involvement of third parties, and the mismanage-
37 For example, elements that form a comprehensive approach to addressing
trafficking in persons range from comprehensive legal frameworks to accounts
of the underlying social, political, and economic realities that fuel trafficking in
persons.
38 G Hugo, p. 26.
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ment of migration systems will be challenging, but is there
really an alternative?
Policies Based on Empirical Evidence
A final major constraint that needs to be addressed is the lack
of timely, comprehensive, and accurate data39 related to the
scope and scale of trafficking in persons and the smuggling of
migrants. Systems to collect data are inconsistent across
countries and are not often maintained in a way that makes
the information amenable to analysis. As a result, there is an
inadequate picture of cross-border movements around the
world. Reliable data are required to systematically analyse the
causes, dynamics, and impact of migrant smuggling and
trafficking in persons in source, transit, and destination
countries. In this regard, border and immigration officials have
important roles in intelligence gathering. The analytical and
investigative capacities of some countries need to be enhanced,
but evidence-based knowledge is crucial to developing effective
policies and counter-measures that address trafficking in
persons and migrant smuggling. Improved research and data
collection will strengthen more proactive, comprehensive, and
informed policies and responses.40 Indeed, critics are right in
saying that restrictive migration policies and border controls
are not often based on empirical evidence but on
misinformation and pressure from interest groups.41
Conclusion
The need for human rights protections for migrants, whether
trafficked or not, is both evident and growing. States need to
be convinced that migrants’ rights are integral to their security,
border, and migration management policies and objectives.
39 Ibid., p. 2.
40 See the UNODC’s Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and Related
Conduct (VRS-MSRC) at www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2013/04/
bali-process/story.html.
41 G Hugo, p. 1.
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The primary responsibility rests with the state to address
trafficking in persons and uphold trafficked persons’ rights.
Tensions between sovereignty and protection are nothing new,
and it is time to consider how states might combine tightly
managed migration and strict border controls with the
protection of human rights in the current context of
globalisation. We think this effort is deserving of support.
Otherwise, we are no closer to practical solutions than we
were over a decade ago when the Trafficking Protocol came
into existence.
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